The debug stack is the instance an app on the phone talks to, and Maestro is the
only port an app is ever given (the single data plane routes every service under
/api/{service}). Binding 127.0.0.1 makes the instance unreachable from a device
on the LAN — only USB with `adb reverse` could reach it — so the dev compose now
publishes on 0.0.0.0.
The dev maestro container's data root is /data/.dcntrlized
(XDG_DATA_HOME=/data), but bind-mount sources are resolved on the daemon's
host namespace — a nonexistent /data/.dcntrlized/... source made Docker
create empty directories, so the auth hub saw /dcntrlized/pki/tls.crt as a
directory and TLS setup failed. DCNTRLIZED_HOST_DATA_ROOT (compose-injected,
/home/franciscofadigas/.dcntrlized) is now substituted for the container-internal prefix when
building identity bind sources. hostBindSource leaves paths unchanged on host
installs.
The single canonical dev flag is DCNTRLIZED_DEV=true, injected by every
docker-compose.debug/dev.yaml. Dev mode now selects endpoints and behaviors
without downgrading control-plane security:
- lib/env: IsDev()/GiteaURL(); registry BaseURL keys on DCNTRLIZED_DEV and
DCNTRLIZED_GITEA_URL (renamed from GITEA_URL).
- authmgmt: Scheme()/PeerTransport() (satellite edges) key on DCNTRLIZED_DEV
— dev satellites keep a plaintext RN-facing listener, production mTLS. The
auth-management edge (New()) stays mTLS in both, preferring
DCNTRLIZED_AUTH_URL in dev.
- Removed INSECURE_INTERNAL + propagateInsecureInternal from Maestro: the
orchestrator no longer runs plaintext, and no longer injects the escape
hatch into services it starts.
- lib/devboot: at boot (dev only) Maestro provisions the identities its
compose-managed peers bind-mount at /dcntrlized/pki (before infra boots)
and approves the known fleet in the auth trust store. Unknown peers still
record a pending authorization and are refused (mechanisms active).
- Composes: prod docker-compose.yaml is clean (no DCNTRLIZED_DEV/GITEA_URL);
the debug compose carries the dev flag + DCNTRLIZED_GITEA_URL only.
Extract maestroTransport() (Maestro's identity cert + instance CA) and
expose PeerTransport()/Scheme()/InsecureInternal() so every service peer
edge uses the same client. RunAction now targets
https://{ip}:{port}/action/{name} presenting Maestro's cert (services
require a CA-issued client cert, so only Maestro can drive actions — T4)
and FetchManifestWithRetry fetches /_manifest the same way.
INSECURE_INTERNAL=1 keeps the dev fleet plaintext (debug compose updated
to set it).
Admin